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Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral
and policy interests (e.g. \divided government"). I investigate the tradeo® between
policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party may
cater to opposing special interests. The value of an opposition veto depends on whether
electoral accountability can discipline bad type politicians. When this is not the case, a
veto is bene¯cial only if the governments special interests are expected to be harmful.
In contrast, when bad types care about (re-)election, a veto always increases expected
welfare, providing a new rationale for the frequent occurrence of \divided government".
Without policy rivalry, an opposition veto fares even better.
JEL-Classi¯cation: A12, D72, D78, H11
Keywords: Political Accountability, Opposition, Veto, Divided Government
¤I would like to thank Anke Kessler, Alexander Koch, Gerd Muehlheusser, Patrick Schmitz and Urs
Schweizer for helpful comments. Financial support of the DFG is gratefully acknowledged. Contact: Univer-
sity of Bonn, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Adenauerallee 24-26, 53113 Bonn, Germany, +49-228-73 39 19,
morgenstern@uni-bonn.de.
11 Introduction
It is one of the constituting elements of democracy that hardly any decision can be taken
unilaterally. In presidential regimes such as the US, constitutions require the consent of both
the legislative and the executive arms of government for bills to become law and important
appointments to be made. In parliamentary regimes, such separation between parliament
and government is less strict but often a second chamber, or upper house, needs to approve
before policy can be implemented.1
A major rationale for such veto arrangements are agency problems. Political decision-
makers wield power which they may not always use in the best interest of the voters. To
endow an impartial actor with the right to veto harmful policies is a tool to curb this power
and prevent its abuse.2 The drawback, however, is that real veto actors are usually not
impartial at all. Since competition for political o±ce in modern democracies is dominated by
very few parties serving di®erent constituencies, it is frequently the case that the incumbents
of government o±ce and the veto institution have both rival partisan and electoral interests.
In these instances, the right to veto creates new agency problems { the opposition party
may have an interest to use its veto power strategically to advance its own policy agenda or
improve election prospects relative to the governing party.
For instance, 17 out of the last 26 US congressional terms have been periods of \divided
government" during which the Presidency and the House and/or the Senate were held by
di®erent parties. This has caused a great deal of debate about the e±ciency of government
among scholars and policy-makers alike. Fiorina [12] summarizes their concern that \the
development of a persistent coalition of divided government vitiates the critical coordinating
force of party. Institutional rivalries now are buttressed by partisan rivalry and partisan
electoral interests" (p. 97, italics added), which are feared to lead to mutual policy blockade
and obstruction (\legislative gridlock").
Although divided government cannot occur in parliamentary systems, there is the possibil-
ity for \divided legislature" which fuels similar concerns. For example, most of the legislation
of the German Bundestag needs the approval of the Bundesrat. This second chamber is
supposed to represent the interests of the LÄ ander but is usually divided along party lines.
Moreover, the majority of the contenders for the Chancellorship are past or current prime
ministers in one of the federal states. Hence, the governing Bundestag coalition has been
frequently confronted with its opposition in control of the Bundesrat.3
1Examples include Australia, Germany and Italy.
2See e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole [10] where the decision of a potentially biased party has to be subjected
to the review by a second decision-maker upon the appeal of an advocate for the disadvantaged cause.
3E.g., the coalition government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats faced a Christian Democratic
LÄ ander majority during their whole term of o±ce 1969-1982. The reverse situation occurred in much of the
2This raises the question whether it is still desirable to have a veto arrangement under
the adverse conditions of strong party competition. Put di®erently, are voters in the US
hurting themselves when they award the Presidency and the Congress to di®erent parties?
Could parliamentary regimes be better o® without the upper house having a say, and thereby
shutting the back door entry for the parliamentary opposition into political decision-making?
In short, does the presence of an opposition veto curb power or progress?
I address these issues in a model of political accountability in which two parties with
rivaling constituencies and electoral interests have to jointly decide on policy. In particular, I
consider a polity in which a proposal of publicly unobservable quality by the governing party
can only get implemented if it is approved by the opposition party, as well.4 In principle,
a veto can be valuable since the governing party's agenda is in°uenced by special interests,
and a bad government may want to pursue these interests even to the detriment of general
welfare. However, a veto can also be costly because the opposition represents competing
special interests and a bad opposition may therefore block policy change even when it would
be socially bene¯cial. Since both parties stand for second period o±ce, a bad government and
a bad opposition have not only completely opposite policy preferences but rivalling electoral
interests, too.
The main result of the paper is that, even in the \worst case" scenario of policy and
electoral rivalry, requiring the opposition party to approve might still be a good thing to
do. In particular, it turns out that such a veto arrangement works most e®ectively whenever
political competition is most intense { an opposition veto reinforces the positive e®ect that
electoral accountability has on policy outcomes.5
More precisely, the social value of a veto depends on whether the special interest driven
parties assign more importance to their current policy objectives or to the rewards from
future o±ce, i.e. whether their motivation to get (re-)elected is relatively weak or strong.
With weak electoral concerns, a bad government cannot be induced to refrain from pushing
its special interest policy, regardless of the costs to society and its own election prospects.
Likewise, a bad opposition cannot be disciplined to abstain from vetoing such a policy even
if it would generate a social surplus. Hence, the value of an opposition veto depends on the
relative merit of either stance: if the special interest policy promoted by a bad government is
1990s. For details on German divided legislature see BrÄ auninger and KÄ onig [6].
4Notwithstanding the \government-opposition" terminology of parliamentary regimes, the model applies
to both divided government and divided legislatures. See section 3 for a discussion.
5Free and regular elections provide incumbents with a threat of being replaced. This can serve as a powerful
incentive to refrain from misbehaving, e.g., to appear more competent in a career concern model or because
voters use the ballot box for retrospective rewards or punishment (see e.g. Persson/Tabellini [18]). However,
electoral accountability can also induce the incumbent to cater to the electorate's beliefs (as in Maskin/Tirole
[13]).
3more likely to harm society than provide a bene¯t, it is better to have too much interference
rather than none at all. In contrast, if the government's special interests coincide on average
with those of society as a whole, the bad opposition's excessive veto activity inhibits progress
more often than it prevents damage. In this case, an opposition veto leaves voters worse o®.
However, if electoral accountability already provides strong election concerns, giving the
opposition some veto power always improves the expected policy outcome. The intuition
is that both bad politicians have a powerful incentive to present themselves a being good,
i.e. electable. This implies that a bad government should not be seen to promote its special
interests (i.e. propose policy) more often than a good government would. Likewise, a bad
opposition has an incentive to avoid the impression that it caters to its own (opposite) special
interests and is led to approve as often as a good opposition would. This leads to a situation
in which the (expected) quality of policy proposals is so high that the good opposition never
wants to veto, implying that the bad opposition never dares to do so. Hence, with su±ciently
strong election concerns, a veto increases average quality of policy outcomes and improves
social welfare.
In the absence of policy rivalries, an opposition veto continues to be socially bene¯cial. In
particular, a bad opposition without a clear policy stance will do whatever improves electoral
prospects. Hence, voters disregard the opposition's action and will base their vote on the
government's signal alone. Thus, the good opposition is free to veto e±ciently while the
(indi®erent) bad opposition may as well approve of any proposal that has been made. Hence,
a veto arrangement means additional control on the policy's quality (when the opposition is
good) while avoiding \gridlock" (when the opposition is bad).
Models of political accountability model have been ¯rst proposed by Ferejohn [11] and
Austen-Smith and Banks [4].6 Persson, Roland, and Tabellini [17] use such a setup with
homogenous politicians and unobservable actions to argue the case for the separation of
powers. In their model, each arm of government can divert resources for private purposes
and a carefully designed procedure of joint decision-making minimizes these rents. This is
because the budgeting choices can be separated such that no political actor can unilaterally
advance its interests. Instead, each arm of government has an interest to veto rent-seeking
by the other since there is no possibility to commit to share jointly approved rents and voters
will oust both incumbents whenever joint rents exceed the status quo level.
Although Persson et al. provide a case for veto arrangements, it is not self-evident that
their argument extends to modern party based systems. For example, it seems unlikely that
there is no way to share jointly approved rents if both arms of government are controlled
6In analogy to Maskin and Tirole [13] and Coate and Morris [8], the setup in this paper slightly di®ers
from this literature since actions are observable but their consequences and politicians' preferences are not.
4by the same party. Even if this is not the case and the executive and the legislative are in
the hands of di®erent parties, separation of powers may still not work: after all, if there are
only two main parties around, voters cannot credibly threaten to oust incumbents of both
arms of government, simultaneously. It is therefore unclear what happens to the separation
of powers when it can be \undone" or impaired by a su±ciently polarized party system. The
present paper takes a ¯rst step in addressing this question by going beyond policy con°icts
and taking electoral rivalries into account.
As noted above, this approach does also re°ect the debate on \divided government" in
the US. The main concern in the literature is that con°icting policy interests may lead
to legislative inactivity. E.g., in Alesina and Drazen [1], necessary stabilization is postponed
because the two decisive (and a®ected) groups are in a \war of attrition" in which the loser has
to bear a higher burden.7 The empirical evidence for such a \gridlock" has been inconclusive.
Some studies found a signi¯cant negative impact of divided government and others did not.8
However, the research question has mostly been one of quantity (of bills passed) rather than
quality. In this paper, veto power only induces \gridlock" when electoral concerns are weak
because then, the government policy has a lower probability of being implemented. Even in
this instance, an opposition veto may improve policy outcomes in terms of expected quality.
With strong electoral concerns, there will be no gridlock at all and policies' average quality will
always be better. Hence, divided government can be bene¯cial with or without a reduction
in legislative activity. This provides a new rationale for voters to deliberately choose divided
government and complements the ¯ndings of Alesina and Rosenthal ([2], [3]) who argue that
the electorate uses split party control in order to moderate policy outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 set up the model and discuss relevant
applications. Equilibrium outcomes and results will be presented in sections 4 and 5. Finally,
section 6 brie°y discusses the case without policy rivalry before section 7 concludes.
2 The political game
Polity. There are two political parties G and O, two associated special interest groups G
and O of equal size and the electorate. G is the party that is initially \in government" and
O the one \in opposition". The polity lasts for two periods t 2 f1;2g.
In t = 1, G has to decide whether to propose some policy (x1 = 1) or to leave it (x1 = 0).
Given that a proposal has been made, O then chooses whether to approve (z = 1) or to veto
it (z = 0). The policy is only implemented in the former case. After the decision, voters
7Tsebelis [19] asserts that, in general, more veto players mean more \policy stability" since they are less
likely to ¯nd mutually bene¯cial ways for policy change.
8See, e.g., Mayhew [15], Fiorina [12] and Bowling and Ferguson [5].
5elect G or O to form government in period t = 2. Denoting the successor government by S,
if voters choose e = 1, then S = G and the new incumbent is the old one, while, for e = 0,
S = O and the previous opposition ascends to power.
In t = 2, the new government S again proposes a policy (x2 = 1) or not (x2 = 0). Since
there is are no additional insights to be gained from second period interaction, I assume that
this stage's proposal cannot be vetoed by the opposition and is implemented straight away.9


































Figure 1. Sequence of events.
Policies. To emphasize the role of veto arrangements in a political agency context, the
focus is on policy decisions that may be purely driven by special interests. Like in Coate
and Morris [8], the government of the day can commission a public project that is certain to
generate bene¯ts Át > 0 to its associated interest group but implies an uncertain and publicly
unobservable payo® µt to the electorate. This social bene¯t µt is distributed independently
across time on [µ; ¹ µ] according to F(µ) (with positive density f(µ)) and ¹ µ > 0 > µ. That is,
it is possible that the policy improves voters' welfare but it also can harm them.10
In order to highlight the rivalry between political players, I also assume that the bene¯t
to one constituency is the loss of the other. That is, whenever the current government
implements the public project, this increases the payo® of its associated special interest
9Special interest groups G and O serve to motivate the parties' payo®s but their behavior is not explicitly
modelled here. Treating them as part of the electorate would increase notational complexity without a®ecting
the results.
10This setup re°ects a broad class of decisions. According to Tullock [20], \redistribution is probably
the most important single function of modern governments" and does frequently take the form of disguised
transfers, e.g. by favorable regulation. Using the same kind of policy decision, Coate and Morris [8] argue
that almost all public expenditure projects share the features of this model's policy in that, (i) they indirectly
bene¯t special interest while (ii) the gain to society as a whole is uncertain, (iii) citizens have less information
about this social value than politicians and (iv) may not even be able to observe whether the project was
bene¯cial ex post.
6group by Át while the current opposition's special interest group will su®er a loss of ¡Át. It
will become clear below that this assumption does not a®ect the qualitative results. For now,
it simply ensures the strongest possible con°ict of parties' interest and therefore the greatest
potential for the abuse of veto power.11
Parties. Political parties may be either \good" (TI = g) or \bad" (TI = b) where I 2
fG;Og. When not in o±ce, they both receive a payo® of zero and types do not matter.
As incumbents, the good politicians share the preferences of the general public while the
bad ones only care for the well-being of their constituency. Put di®erently, a bad party is
\captured" by special interests.12 In addition, holding o±ce generate ego-rent R > 0. Since
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Since there are no electoral or veto restrictions in t = 2, it is straightforward to see that a
good period-2 government implements a policy only if µ2 ¸ 0 while a bad one will disregard
social surplus and always implement its policy in order to receive Á2. The expected period-2
payo®s of good and bad politicians are therefore,13




© ´ R + Á2;
respectively. I make the following assumptions on the relative size of ¯rst period policy
surplus and parties' election payo®s.
11Observe that, in this case, it does not matter whether per period social surplus is de¯ned in terms of the
electorate's payo® µt or the overall bene¯t of all groups from a public project, Át + µt ¡ Át = µt.
12One interpretation is that politicians di®er in their propensity to take bribes or succumb to pressure.
Alternatively, decision-makers could be socially minded but more or less subjected to outside pressure. E.g.
a party leader could be constrained by the party's potentially ideologically biased rank-and-¯le as in Caillaud
and Tirole [7]. Likewise, the pressure could come from outside groups against which only a strong (\good")
party can protect them (see for instance Dal B¶ o and Di Tella [9]). In any case, the setup implicitly assumes
that interest groups are strong enough to put their favorite proposal on the agenda and to keep their rival's
favorite project out of the decision-making process.
13Surplus µt need not have the same distribution across special interest group policies and across time. All
that is required for the second period is that voters get a strictly (but not extremely) larger payo® from a
good government in t = 2, irrespective of which interest group it represents.
7Assumption 1. E[µt jµt ¸ ¡¦] ¸ 0
Assumption 2. ¸¹ µ > ¦
Assumption 3. (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ F(0))µ < ¡¦
Assumption 1 ensures that ine±ciencies arising from signalling are not too severe and is
satis¯ed for the uniform distribution or any distribution which is symmetric around zero.
Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that there exist policies which are so bene¯cial respectively
harmful that the good G cannot be deterred by electoral concerns to take the \right" decision
at least in some instances.14
Information and Beliefs. Both G and O are aware of the realization of the random social
surplus µt while voters will experience the associated gain or loss only much later. Though this
informational asymmetry is rather extreme, it encompasses the basic idea that (a) policies
operate in a complex environment in which their actual impact is not easily predictable and
only slowly unravels over time and that (b) policy-makers have more incentives and better
resources to become informed about the consequences of their actions.
I also assume that the types of G and O are private information so that neither the public
nor the political opponent know the nature of the party's preferences. This ensures that
neither party's behavior will be a®ected by the nature of its rival. That is, voters judge the
parties only by their own actions. Since, the electorate's beliefs must be ultimately consistent
with policy-makers' strategies, denote by
xTG
(µ1) 2 [0;1]
the probability with which a governing party G of type TG 2 fg;bg proposes (plays x1 = 1)
for a given surplus µ1 in equilibrium. The ex ante probability that such a G proposes is then
equal to
XTG






while not proposing occurs with probability Pr(x1 = 0 j TG;xTG
(µ1)) = 1 ¡ XTG
. Voters'
14If assumptions 2 and 3 are not satis¯ed, there may be additional equilibria which di®er in the behavior of G
only. However, they require speci¯c parameter constellations to exist and are either (weakly) payo® dominated
for the electorate and either type of G or do not alter the qualitative case for or against an opposition veto.
Moreover, there is no natural reason why special interest policies should not generate the large welfare losses
and gains that assumptions 2 and 3 imply.
8posterior beliefs about G's quality after observing x1 2 f1;0g are therefore
¸G(1) ´ Pr(TG = g j x1 = 1) =
¸Xg
¸Xg + (1 ¡ ¸)Xb;
¸G(0) ´ Pr(TG = g j x1 = 0) =
¸(1 ¡ Xg)
¸(1 ¡ Xg) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ Xb)
:
Analogously, provided that G has played x1 = 1, let
zTO
(µ1) 2 [0;1]
be the probability with which an opposition party O of type TO 2 fg;bg approves (plays
z = 1) for a given surplus µ1. Overall, the expected probability of opposition O taking
action z 2 f1;0g depends not only on O's strategy but also on whether the government has
previously proposed or not. In particular, the opposition faces a cdf. over [µ; ¹ µ] which is







¸xg(µ) + (1 ¡ ¸)xb(µ)
i
dF(µ):
Hence, in equilibrium, an opposition of type TO approves a proposal with probability
ZTO






and vetoes it with Pr(z = 0 j TO;zTO
(µ1)) = 1 ¡ ZTO
. Upon observing the action pro¯le
(x1 = 1;z), voters' beliefs ¸O(z) about the opposition being good therefore take the following
form:
¸O(1) ´ Pr(TO = g j z = 1) =
¸Zg
¸Zg + (1 ¡ ¸)Zb;
¸O(0) ´ Pr(TO = g j z = 0) =
¸(1 ¡ Zg)
¸(1 ¡ Zg) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ Zb)
:
In the present formulation, it may happen that an information set (x1;z) is not reached with
positive probability which precludes the use of Bayes' formula. In principle, in a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium, beliefs can then be assigned ad libitum. The analysis in the appendix
takes a di®erent approach and considers the situation in which the government's proposal
decision is reversed with an arbitrarily small probability ".15 This avoids o®-equilibrium
observations and ensures the robustness of the derived equilibria. For expositional purposes,
the discussion in the main text refers to the limit case in which " = 0.
15Matthews [14] (p. 353) argues that this is rather compelling in a political game. An example could
be that a bill unexpectedly turns out to be unconstitutional or technically infeasible. Likewise, a policy
may be proposed against G's will because of G's constitutional rights or some failure in the workings of the
government's machinery.
9Elections. With these evaluations of parties' quality at hand, voters have to decide whether
to re-elect the incumbent or replace it by the opposition. Recall that any good period-2
government implements policies if µ2 ¸ 0 while its bad counterpart puts its \pet" policy into





µ2 dF(µ2) and Ub = E[µ2];










Since Ug > Ub, voters prefer the party with the higher probability of being good and thus
follow the re-election rule
px1z =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if ¸G(x1) > ¸O(z)
2 [0;1] if ¸G(x1) = ¸O(z)
0 if ¸G(x1) < ¸O(z),
(1)
where px1z is the probability with which G wins the elections.
3 Uni¯ed vs. divided decision-making
The following sections present the outcomes of this political game and compare them to
the outcomes when there is no opposition veto. The latter can imply two scenarios. On
the one hand, it can be interpreted as a situation in which there is a constitutional body
with veto powers which is controlled by the very same party as the \government". Given
a su±cient degree of party cohesion, this corresponds to the case of uni¯ed government or
uni¯ed legislative.16 Alternatively, there may be an opposition but no opportunity to veto
government decisions.
As for the case with an opposition veto, the setting re°ects divided government in the
US in two possible ways. First, G could be the Congress which has the formal privilege of
16Party cohesion in the US may not be as strong as in European (parliamentary) systems, see e.g. Mayhew
[15] (p. 198). However, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal [16] argue that party a±liation shapes the policy
position of individual legislators (and hence indirectly their voting behavior). Moreover, members of the
President's party have fewer incentives for developing a distinct legislative and electoral strategy since they
have less publicity (they act \in the shadow of the White House") and are less likely to have an open shot
at the White House (Mayhew [15], p. 105). Indeed, the whole debate on \divided government" rests on the
assertion that the bene¯ts from the separation of powers are undermined by the dominance of party politics.
10introducing legislation and O would be the president who has a formal veto right. However,
electoral competition would be about the presidency. A probably more natural interpretation
is to view the President as the agenda-setter for legislative projects whose enactment requires
both houses of parliament to approve.17 In this instance, it would be presidential aspirants
with a strong backing in Congress who could use their veto power in order to improve their
position to challenge the incumbent president. Analogously, the electoral rivalry in a divided
legislature does arise from government elections.18 In the following, I will slightly abuse
terminology and summarize the cases under the headings \uni¯ed" and \divided decision-
making", respectively.
Two further remarks are in order. First, observe that the situation with no opposition
veto is equivalent to a political game with no opposition party at all. Without a veto, payo®s
of the relevant players are the same as above with the exception that z is always equal to
one and O has no preferences over policy in t = 1. Then, the opposition could not credibly
convey anything about µ1 or G's type even if it could send a message because any such
message would purely be motivated by the electoral rivalry between G and O. Consequently,
the context is equivalent to a situation with an anonymous challenger of expected quality
¸.19 Hence, the comparison takes place between unilateral decision-making (without veto,
uni¯ed government) and joint decision-making (with veto, divided government).
Second, it will facilitate the further discussion to introduce the concept of a \¯ctitious
discount factor" ± for the bad parties, which neatly captures their tradeo® between current









Roughly, if ± < 1, then the ¯rst-period decision matters much more to the bad policymaker
than holding government in t = 2, i.e. election concerns are weak. In contrast, ± > 1 implies
that bad types may have an incentive to forego current policy objectives in exchange for
future opportunities to hold o±ce and decide. Hence, election concerns are strong. I consider
the cases in turn.
17Mayhew [15] ¯nds that many of the major enactments between 1946 and 1990 were presidential projects.
18In Germany, almost every contender for the chancellorship had previously governed a federal state and
parties view the Bundesrat as a political instrument at the federal level.
19This is the standard setup in the political economics literature, see Persson/Tabellini [18].
20The term \¯ctitious discount factor" has been proposed by Maskin and Tirole [13].
114 Weak election concerns
4.1 Uni¯ed decision-making
By de¯nition, if ± < 1, the bad government's payo® from its current special interest policy Á1
cannot be outweighed by even a certain re-election and ensuing bene¯ts © from government
o±ce in t = 2. If there is no veto opportunity for other actors, this means that it proposes
(and implements) its \pet" policy in any case. In contrast, the good government will always
consider some policies with very low surplus µ1 to be too harmful to propose regardless of
the electoral consequences. Hence, there is a partial separation of government types. In
particular, voters will perceive proposing (x1 = 1) to be a bad sign of the incumbent's quality
while restraint (x1 = 0) causes them to upgrade their estimate for G. They therefore replace
the government in the former case and re-elect it in the latter. This makes proposing relatively
more costly in terms of electoral prospects. Accordingly, the good government only comes
forward when the policy surplus is su±ciently large to compensate for the loss from losing
o±ce, i.e. if µ1 ¸ ¦. These observations are summarized in lemma 1.21
Lemma 1 (Unilateral decisions with weak election concerns).
If election concerns are weak and O has no veto power,
1. a bad G proposes for all µ1;
2. a good G only proposes if µ1 ¸ ¦;
3. G is re-elected if and only if it does not propose (p0 = 1;p1 = 0).
There are two aspects that in°uence expected social welfare. First, there is always the
current bene¯t from the period-1 decision. Without a veto, a good G (occurring with prob-
ability ¸) implements all policies µ1 ¸ ¦. With the complementary probability, G is a bad
type and pursues its special interests in any case which implies an expected outcome of E[µ1].
Second, the election outcome determines the quality of the government decision in t = 2.
Since the equilibrium is partly separating, there are selection bene¯ts. In the present case, if
G is bad and O is good, the excessive proposal activity of the former leads voters to always
replace the incumbent by a better challenger. If G is good and O is bad, however, the
incumbent may be ine±ciently ousted from o±ce whenever µ1 ¸ ¦ and a proposal is made.









+ ¸Ug + (1 ¡ ¸)Ub + ¸(1 ¡ ¸)F(¦)(Ug ¡ Ub):
21For the derivation, see section A.2 and table 1 in the appendix.
124.2 Divided decision-making
With a veto opportunity, the opposition's situation to some extent mirrors that of the incum-
bent government in the previous section { given the proposal by G, it decides unilaterally
about its implementation or not. It is therefore not surprising that O's behavior follows
similar lines. In particular, the bad opposition will always veto because the policy costs
¡Á1 cannot be compensated by even a certain electoral success. Hence, the observation of
z = 0 is an indication that O is more likely to be driven by special interests. For the good
opposition, this means that blocking a proposal may be valuable in social terms but costs
electoral chances. Therefore, it is willing to approve of projects even when they are (mildly)
harmful to society (µ1 2 [¡¦;0)). Since only a good opposition ever approves, endorsement
is a reliable signal about O's quality and wins the opposition the elections.
Now consider the government. Whenever the policy has a chance of being approved
(µ1 ¸ ¡¦), the bad type cannot be induced to refrain from its preferred action. Whether
this means losing the election now depends not only on its proposal (indicating a preference
for special interests) but also on the reaction of the opposition which might have an even worse
expected quality. Indeed, O's action is considered to be a \stronger" signal than G's in that
it leads to a greater adjustment of posterior beliefs.22 Hence, voters re-elect the incumbent if
its project has been vetoed (p10 = 1) and only oust it from o±ce if the opposition \proves"
to be good and approves (p11 = 0). In turn, a good government has to take this into account.
Because proposing is costly in terms of re-election chances, it requires a \premium" on top
of the socially e±cient surplus and only proposes for µ1 ¸ ¦ > 0.
For projects that will be blocked by any opposition, there is nothing at stake and either
government type can suit its proposal decision to the electoral reaction. In equilibrium,
p10 = p0 and both may to some extent randomize between proposing or not (e.g. such that
xg = xb). Lemma 2 summarizes these results.23
Lemma 2 (Opposition veto with weak election concerns).
If election concerns are weak and O has the right to veto,
1. a bad O vetoes for all µ1;
22The support of the distribution H(µ1) of proposals that actually reach the veto stage is already partly
\truncated" below ¦. Hence, it is less likely that a good opposition has to veto than that a good government
is bound to propose a policy.
23For details, see appendix A.3 and table 2. There is a second equilibrium in which both types of governments
always propose because voters punish legislative restraint by a low p
0 (case (i) in table 2 of appendix A.3).
However, this behavior would not be robust to small mistakes in the opposition's decision. Moreover, both
equilibria generate the same social bene¯t under the assumptions for the welfare comparison in the next
section.
132. a good O approves if µ1 ¸ ¡¦;
3. if µ1 ¸ ¡¦, the bad G proposes with ¹ xb = 1;
if µ1 < ¡¦, it proposes with probability xb;
4. if µ1 ¸ ¡¦, the good G only proposes if µ1 ¸ ¦,
if µ1 < ¡¦, it proposes with probability xg;




xg + 1 ¡ F(¦)
xb + 1 ¡ F(¡¦)
· 1:
6. G is re-elected if it shows restraint (p0 = 1) or if O vetoes (p10 = 1),
otherwise voters elect O (p11 = 0).
Even the bad type of government is now forced to take the social surplus µ1 into account.
This is not by direct preference but because µ1 determines the decision of the good O and
therefore expected policy implementation and evaluation. Also, making a proposal does
not automatically mean losing o±ce anymore. When surplus is su±ciently low (µ1 < ¡¦),
even good governments may come forward and propose because the policy will never be
implemented anyway, and a veto costs the opposition even more than proposing costs the
government. Thus, (ine®ectual) proposals can be made by any type of government.
Expected social welfare can again be attributed to current policy e®ects and selection
bene¯ts. Consider the latter. There is no di®erence if both parties are either good or bad.
If G is bad and O is good, the government is only replaced if µ1 ¸ ¡¦ and the opposition
approves. In the reverse case, the bad O always opposes which leads voters to retain the










+ ¸Ug + (1 ¡ ¸)Ub + (1 ¡ ¸)¸(1 ¡ F(¡¦))(Ug ¡ Ub):
4.3 The value of veto power { weak concerns
I can now derive the value of an opposition veto by comparing expected social welfare under
the alternative regimes. Formally, this is expressed by the di®erence
WD
w ¡ WU

















14The ¯rst line corresponds to the net current bene¯t of having opposition control. The basic
tradeo® in this respect is between quantity and quality. With a veto, a government needs a
good opposition to get its proposal passed which decreases the chances of project implemen-
tation. However, a good opposition only approves of projects above a certain surplus and a
bad one vetoes indiscriminately, such that the expected quality of an implemented reform is
larger than in the benchmark case, as well.
The second line re°ects the welfare consequences of di®erences in government selection.
The regime without veto produces a \type I error" in that a good government may be
replaced by a bad one. This happens whenever µ1 > ¦ and G proposes, i.e. with probability
¸(1 ¡ ¸)[1 ¡ F(¦)]. While this does not occur if there is a veto opportunity, this regime
admits a \type II error" in that a bad incumbent is not exchanged by a good opposition. In
particular, this is the case if µ1 < ¡¦ and the bad G either refrains from proposing or waits
for the good O to turn it down. The probability of such an event is (1 ¡ ¸)¸F(¡¦).
How these tradeo®s resolve and which e®ect dominates depends on the parameters of the
problem. I consider symmetric and uniform distributions of µt.
Proposition 1 (Veto value for weak election concerns).
If election concerns are weak
1. and F(¢) is symmetric around µt = 0, social welfare is the same under a regime with
an opposition veto and one without;
2. and µt is uniformly distributed on [µ; ¹ µ], an opposition veto yields a lower welfare than
the benchmark whenever E[µt] < 0 and a higher welfare whenever E[µt] > 0.
Hence, if electoral concerns are weak, the question whether to endow a potentially adver-
sarial opposition with veto rights depends on the expected surplus of the decision itself. If
E[µt] is positive, then a bad government proposes on average socially bene¯cial projects even
though this may be inspired by special interests. A bad opposition's excessive veto activity
would therefore cause high opportunity costs by preventing bene¯cial policy changes. In
contrast, if E[µt] is negative, the bad government's policy projects imply social costs more
often than social bene¯ts. In this case, it is better to have too much veto activity rather than
too little. Hence, requiring the consent of the opposition is a sensible thing to do.
The usefulness of an opposition veto does therefore depend on whether a constitution
can identify these di®erent contexts and assign veto power selectively. To make its impact
unequivocally welfare-enhancing, a second ingredient is needed: the e®ectiveness of electoral
accountability. This is shown in the next section.
155 Strong election concerns
5.1 Uni¯ed decision-making
Strong election concerns (± > 1) imply that the bad government is prepared to sacri¯ce the
payo® Á1 if this would guarantee re-election and the associated bene¯t of R + Á2. Hence, a
bad G does not always implement its favorite project since this would send a bad signal to
the electorate and cost future government bene¯ts. Instead, it mimics its good counterpart
in order to appear to be good as well. That is, in equilibrium, the bad G only proposes with
the good type's ex ante probability of proposing. In contrast to the weak concerns case, this
means that the bad incumbent will not always realize harmful projects; however, there is also
a chance that it will not propose the bene¯cial ones.
Since voters are unable to detect any di®erence in types' behavior, they are indi®erent
between G and O after any kind of government decision. Nevertheless, they continue to
reward restraint (x1 = 0) more than initiative on behalf of the interest group (x1 = 1) (albeit
on a smaller scale). Consequently, the good G still requires a proposal to generate a strictly
positive (though smaller) level of surplus before it implements a policy and pays the electoral
costs. lemma 3 summarizes this pattern of equilibrium behavior.24
Lemma 3 (Unilateral decisions with strong election concerns).
If election concerns are strong and O has no veto power,
1. a bad G proposes with probability xb = 1 ¡ F(1
±¦) = Xg for all µ1;
2. a good G only proposes if µ1 ¸ 1
±¦;
3. voters are indi®erent but more likely to re-elect G for x1 = 0 (p0 ¡ p1 = 1
±).
Since both government types pool in equilibrium, there is no information revelation and
the interim expected selection bene¯ts are the same as ex ante. As for current bene¯ts, the
bad G appears to be doing the same as the good G but only in expected terms. Hence, it
implements the policy with a certain probability even if its surplus realization is negative and











µ1dF(µ1) + ¸Ug + (1 ¡ ¸)Ub:
24For details, see section A.2 and table 1 in the appendix.
165.2 Divided decision-making
Like in the case of weak election concerns, an opposition with veto power is in a situation that
mirrors that of the government with respect to electoral concerns. Thus, ceteris paribus, the
bad O would always prefer to veto the project in order to avoid its cost, ¡Á1 but would thereby
risk the larger payo®s from future government. Instead, it mimics the average behavior of
the good O. Though voters cannot distinguish types, they still reward approval more than
a veto. Therefore, the good opposition blocks the more harmful projects but is a little too
lenient on the less damaging ones because their prevention does not save enough social loss
in order to compensate the party for the reduction in expected electoral payo®s by 1
±¦.
As for the bad G, the randomization by the bad O implies that there is now a positive
probability that any proposed project will be implemented. However, the bad G does not
take systematic advantage of this since proposing means a lower probability of reaping the
greater election bene¯ts. Instead, it imitates the good G by applying the same equilibrium
probabilities in randomizing over proposal activity. Thus, the electorate cannot update its be-
lief about the incumbent, either, and is therefore indi®erent between G and O. Nevertheless,
restraint by G is still rewarded more highly than a proposal. Hence, the good government is
somewhat fastidious and only tables policies which yield at least 1
±¦ in order to compensate
for the loss in electoral prospects.25
Lemma 4 (Opposition veto with strong election concerns).
If election concerns are strong and O has the power to veto,
1. a bad O vetoes with probability 1 ¡ zb = H(¡1
±¦) = 1 ¡ Zg for all µ1.
2. a good O only approves if µ1 ¸ ¡1
±¦;
3. if µ1 ¸ ¡1
±¦, a bad G proposes with probability ¹ xb > 0;
if µ1 < ¡1
±¦, a bad G proposes with probability xb ¸ 0
such that Xb = xbF(¡1




= 1 ¡ F(1
±¦) = Xg;
4. a good G only proposes if µ1 ¸ 1
±¦;
5. voters are indi®erent but more likely to re-elect G
if it shows restraint or O vetoes (p10 ¡ p11 = p0 ¡ p11 = 1
±).
Since both bad types have strong incentives to present themselves as worthy for period-2
government, they imitate the good types' average behavior. The bad opposition approves
with probability zb = Zb = 1 ¡ H(¡1
±¦) which coincides with Zg and the bad government
25For details of the proof, see section A.3 and table 2 in the appendix.
17proposes such that Xb = Xg. Exactly how the bad G mimics its good counterpart is a priori
not clear, i.e. there is a potential multiplicity of equilibria which di®er with respect to the
implemented outcome. However, the next lemma establishes that there is a unique (weakly)
payo®-dominant equilibrium, on which the further discussion will focus exclusively.
Lemma 5 (Payo®-dominant equilibrium).
If election concerns are strong and O has veto power, there is a No-Veto equilibrium in which
² if µ1 < ¡1
±¦, the bad G proposes with probability xb = 0;
² if µ1 ¸ ¡1





² both the good and the bad O always approve.
This No-Veto equilibrium yields the good parties and the electorate a strictly higher expected
payo® than any other equilibrium described in lemma 4 while it leaves the bad parties with
the same expected payo® as all other equilibria.
In the No-Veto equilibrium, the bad G never tables projects of quality lower than the
good O's acceptance threshold, ¡1
±¦. Instead, it proposes policies above this threshold with
the highest probability consistent with pooling. Since this implies that no government G will
ever make a proposal that is not approved by the good opposition, the bad opposition cannot
a®ord to veto without revealing its type. Hence, it will always accept as well and there
is no veto activity along the equilibrium path.26 Expected social welfare in the No-Veto















µ1dF(µ1) + ¸Ug + (1 ¡ ¸)Ub:
5.3 The value of veto power { strong concerns
Since strong electoral concerns lead the bad types to mimic their good counterparts, there is
no separation and hence no selection e®ect either with or without a veto. The social value
26The reluctance to actually use veto power is broadly in line with empirical observations in established
democracies. In the 1990s, about 75 per cent of the proposals of the German federal government were adopted
even though the Bundestag and the Bundesrat were held by rival party majorities (see BrÄ auninger and KÄ onig
[6]). For the US, Mayhew [15] (p. 104) observes that \[o]ne feature that jumps from the record of 1946-
90 is e®ective lawmaking by members of Congress aiming for the presidency { especially senators" which is
consistent with the model, too. With respect to legislative outcomes across US states in 1994, Bowling and
Ferguson [5] ¯nd that split party control over executive and legislative had no signi¯cant or even a positive
impact on the probability of passing a bill.
18of an opposition veto is solely determined by the e±ciency of the ¯rst period decision. The
di®erence between expected welfare without a veto and in the No-Veto equilibrium equals
¹ WD
s ¡ WU

















In contrast to the case with weak election concerns, no additional assumptions on F(¢) are
necessary to determine the social value of an opposition veto.
Proposition 2 (Veto value with strong election concerns).
If election concerns are strong, expected social welfare is always greater with an opposition
veto than without.
Hence, an opposition veto can unambiguously improve political decision-making but only
in combination with e®ective electoral incentives. In the absence of the latter, neither bad
party will be restrained from wielding its respective (agenda-setting or veto) power, and the
value of the veto arrangement depends on the relative merit of either position for the given
policy. In contrast, if the context is such that political actors have a strong interest to get (re-
)elected, a veto can complement the e®ect of electoral accountability in a socially bene¯cial
way. In particular, competition for second period government already restrains the parties
from abusing their power when G can decide on a unilateral basis. However, since it su±ces
to appear to be good, the bad type mimics its respective good type across the board and still
pays no attention to the social surplus of the policy in question. With an opposition veto,
the bad G is forced to consider this surplus since it a®ects the decision of the good O and
therefore its payo® from policy and from elections. In the No-Veto equilibrium, the latter
refrains from proposing policies that are certain to be rejected by the good O, at all. By
de¯nition, the good G will assent to any proposal and, by imitation, the bad G will have do
so, too.
In the limit, the joint presence of strong electoral concerns and an opposition veto can
achieve even a ¯rst-best decision in period 1.
Remark 1.
As ± ! 1, the outcome of the No-Veto equilibrium approaches a ¯rst-best situation in which
all projects of quality µ1 ¸ 0 are implemented and all projects with negative surplus values
are not.
6 No policy rivalry
The analysis so far has been con¯ned to projects that necessarily redistribute between the
constituencies of the governing and the opposition party. While this serves to underline
19the robustness of veto power (at least for strong electoral concerns) to electoral and policy
rivalry, one might wonder about whether the results still hold when this redistribution does
not occur. Lemma 6 shows that the absence of policy rivalry improves equilibrium outcomes
and makes an opposition veto even more valuable.27
Lemma 6 (Opposition veto without policy rivalry).
If constituency O is not a®ected by the government policy, there are equilibria such that
1. the good opposition vetoes whenever it is e±cient, i.e. if µ1 < 0;
2. for all ±, it is an equilibrium strategy for the bad opposition not to veto;
3. the good government proposes in the same way as in the case with policy rivalry;
4. the bad opposition proposes
² always if ± < 1 ¡ ¸




1¡F(0) for µ1 ¸ 0 and not otherwise if ± ¸ 1.
When the government's favor does not a®ect the opposition's constituency, the bad oppo-
sition has no stake in the policy and does whatever improves the electoral prospects. Hence,
in equilibrium, the opposition's decision will not a®ect the voting decision and therefore
p11 = p10.28 Put di®erently, voting decisions are only based on government actions, just like
in the case of uni¯ed decision-making. As a consequence, the bad opposition is indi®erent
and may as well approve of any proposal. Moreover, the good opposition can take the veto
decision without regard for future o±ce and only based on the current bene¯ts µ1 that the
policy generates.
As for the government, the bad type still proposes too often and the good type is therefore
inclined to show restraint as long as µ1 is not too large. However, the bad government can
be disciplined for lower values of ± than before. In particular, it already proposes e±ciently
whenever ± is smaller than 1 but larger than 1 ¡ ¸.29
27For details, see section F and table 3 in the appendix.
28If one action is rewarded relative to the other, the bad opposition will take this action. But then, consistent
beliefs have to take into account that this action is more likely to be taken by the bad opposition which means
that it could not be rewarded in the ¯rst place.
29This is because low quality proposals are relatively more costly than under uni¯ed decision-making. With-
out a veto, a low quality proposal generates Á1 while restraint ensures re-election payo® ©. With a veto, a
low quality proposal is rejected when the opposition is good but the re-election probability is zero whether
there has been a veto or not. Hence, a proposal yields (1 ¡ ¸)Á while restraint still ensures ©. Thus, it takes
a higher current payo® in order to make a proposal attractive.
20From lemma 6, it is immediate that an opposition veto works even better in the absence
of policy rivalries if ± ¸ 1. Moreover, it can be shown that it improves general welfare even
for cases in which ± < 1 and E[µt] ¸ 0. The intuition is that the excessive veto activity of
a bad opposition that obtains with policy rivalry and insu±cient electoral concerns does not
occur anymore when there is no policy interest by O's constituency. Hence, proposals that
would have been blocked by a special interest driven veto actor are now put into practice. In
addition, the good opposition pursues a more e±cient veto strategy since it is not deterred
by electoral concerns, anymore.
7 Concluding remarks
To conclude, the paper demonstrates that there is a case for veto institutions even though
they may be occupied by political rivals of the government. However, a veto arrangement on
its own does not su±ce to ensure better policy. What is also needed is a su±ciently strong
degree of electoral accountability, i.e. the desire of bad parties to get (re-)elected. Only then
can bad parties be forced to act in the public interest albeit not for its own sake but to
appear electable. As a result, the government only promotes special interest policies if they
are at least of a certain minimum quality. This includes a few projects with negative welfare
implication but will imply an average policy with a positive social surplus. Since neither
type of opposition objects, these proposals can be implemented to the (expected) bene¯t of
society with probability one. In short, an opposition veto curbs power rather than progress
but only if its use is curbed by (re-)election concerns itself.
Given that established democracies can provide strong electoral concerns, the paper there-
fore provides a rationale why veto arrangements have survived in modern party dominated
polities. Moreover, it has been shown that a veto arrangement does fare even better when the
bad opposition has no stake in G's preferred policy but simply cares about getting elected. In
this case, a veto arrangement outperforms unilateral decision-making even for weak election
concerns. At least with respect to these arguments, the paper therefore shows that voters
may actually prefer to delegate government o±ce to one party and a veto institution to its
rival, as observed in both the US and Germany.
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This section derives the equilibria presented in sections 4 and 5. All arguments are made with respect
to the case in which G's proposal decision is subject to small exogenous shocks, i.e. can be reversed
with probability " ! 0. Essentially, this yields the same results as " = 0 (the case presented in
the main text) but facilitates the analysis with respect to o® equilibrium behavior and ensures their
robustness. That is, G's decision xt 2 f0;1g only materializes with probability
¿(xt) ´ (1 ¡ ")xt + "(1 ¡ xt):




























" 2 (";1 ¡ ") and H"(µ1) 2 ("F(µ1);(1 ¡ ")F(µ1)) 8µ1.
A.2 Uni¯ed decision-making
Electoral strategy. Since O is not involved in decision-making, it cannot credibly convey infor-





1 if ¸G(x1) < ¸
2 [0;1] if ¸G(x1) = ¸
0 if ¸G(x1) > ¸.













Government strategies. Consider ¯rst the good G. It prefers x1 = 1 over x1 = 0 as long as
¿(1)
¡
µ1 + p1 ¦
¢
+ (1 ¡ ¿(1))p0¦ ¸ ¿(0)
¡
µ1 + p1 ¦
¢
+ (1 ¡ ¿(0))p0¦
, µ1 + p1 ¦ ¸ p0¦




Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that · µ 2 (µ; ¹ µ). Then,
xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ · µ
0 if µ1 < · µ
) Xg
" = "F(· µ) + (1 ¡ ")
¡
1 ¡ F(· µ)
¢
2 (";1 ¡ "):









+ (1 ¡ ¿(0))p0©
, Á1 + p1© ¸ p0©
, 1
± ¸ p0 ¡ p1:
24(a) ± < 1 xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ ¦
0 if µ1 < ¦
xb = 1
p1 = 0; p0 = 1
(b) ± = 1 xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ ¦
0 if µ1 < ¦
xb > 1 ¡ F(¦)
p1 = 0; p0 = 1
(c) ± ¸ 1 xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ 1
±¦
0 if µ1 < 1
±¦
xb = 1 ¡ F(1
±¦)
p1 ¡ p0 = ¡1
±
Table 1. Equilibria without Opposition Veto.






± > p0 ¡ p1
2 [0;1] if 1
± = p0 ¡ p1
0 if 1
± < p0 ¡ p1:
) Xb
" = (1 ¡ ")xb + "(1 ¡ xb):
Equilibria.
² 1
± > p0 ¡ p1.
This implies xb = 1 and thus Xb
" = 1 ¡ ". Then,
Xb
" = 1 ¡ " > "F(· µ) + (1 ¡ ")
¡




implying, p0 = 1 and p1 = 0 and therefore · µ = ¦. Recall that 1
± > p0 ¡ p1 which yields
1
± > 1 , ± < 1. This corresponds to case (a) of table 1.
² 1
± = p0 ¡ p1.
Now, xb 2 [0;1]. First, suppose that Xg
" > Xb
". This implies p0 = 0 and p1 = 1. Hence,
p0 ¡ p1 = ¡1. But then 1




" , "F(· µ) + (1 ¡ ")
¡
1 ¡ F(· µ)
¢
< (1 ¡ ")xb + "(1 ¡ xb)
, xb > 1 ¡ F(· µ):
This implies p1 = 0 and p0 = 1. Hence, p0 ¡ p1 = 1 and · µ = ¦. By the initial presumption,
1
± = 1 , ± = 1. This corresponds to case (b) in table 1.
Finally, suppose that Xg
" = Xb
", i.e. xb = 1 ¡ F(· µ). This implies p1 2 [0;1] and p0 2 [0;1].
Thus, p0 ¡ p1 2 [¡1;1]. By 1
± = p0 ¡ p1 > 0 ) p1 ¡ p0 2 (0;1], · µ = 1
±¦ and ± ¸ 1. This
corresponds to case (c) in table 1.
² 1
± < p0 ¡ p1.
This implies xb = 0 and Xb
" = ". Then, Xb
" < Xg
" and p1 = 1 and p0 = 0. Thus, p0 ¡ p1 =
¡1 > 1
± > 0, a contradiction. ¥
25A.3 Divided decision-making
Electoral strategy. By (1), voters choose the party with the higher posterior of being
good. The comparison between G and O translates into






") T (1 ¡ Xb




" if (x1;z) = (1;1)
X
g
"(1 ¡ Zb) T (1 ¡ Zg)Xb
" if (x1;z) = (1;0)
Opposition strategies. Consider ¯rst the good opposition. It will approve of a given







¦ , µ1 ¸ ^ µ ´ ¢p¦
where ¢p ´ p11 ¡ p10. Assumptions 2 and 3 guarantee that ^ µ 2 (µ1; ¹ µ1). Therefore,
zg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ ^ µ
0 if µ1 < ^ µ
) Zg = 1 ¡ H"(^ µ) 2 (0;1):









Therefore, a bad O does not condition its strategy on µ1:










Government strategies for zb = 0. Given strategies zg(µ1) and zb = 0, there will be no
policy implementation for µ1 < ^ µ while for µ1 ¸ ^ µ, at least the good opposition approves.
A good government still tables a proposal of quality µ1 < ^ µ if
¿(1)
¡
¸p10¦ + (1 ¡ ¸)p10¦
¢
+ (1 ¡ ¿(1))p0¦
¸ ¿(0)
¡
¸p10¦ + (1 ¡ ¸)p10¦
¢
+ (1 ¡ ¿(0))p0¦
, ¸p10¦ + (1 ¡ ¸)p10¦ ¸ p0¦
, ¢ ~ p · 0;







+ (1 ¡ ¸)p10¦
¢







+ (1 ¡ ¸)p10¦
¢





+ (1 ¡ ¸)p10¦ ¸ p0¦






26where ¢p0 ´ p0¡p11. Note that assumption 1 ensures that ¹ µ > ~ µH. Letting ~ µ0 ´ maxf^ µ; ~ µHg,
the good G's strategy is
xg(µ1) =
(
¹ xg(µ1) if µ1 ¸ ^ µ






1 if µ1 2
h
~ µ0; ¹ µ
i
0 if µ1 2
³
^ µ; ~ µ0




1 if ¢~ p < 0
2 [0;1] if ¢~ p = 0
0 if ¢~ p > 0:
If µ1 < ^ µ, a bad government proposes whenever
¿(1)
¡
¸p10© + (1 ¡ ¸)p10©
¢
+ (1 ¡ ¿(1))p0©
¸ ¿(0)
¡
¸p10© + (1 ¡ ¸)p10©
¢
+ (1 ¡ ¿(0))p0©
, ¸p10© + (1 ¡ ¸)p10© ¸ p0©
, ¢~ p · 0;







+ (1 ¡ ¸)p10©
¢







+ (1 ¡ ¸)p10©
¢













Thus, the bad G pursues a strategy
xb(µ1) =
(
¹ xb if µ1 ¸ ^ µ







± > ¢p0 + 1¡¸
¸ ¢~ p
2 [0;1] if 1
± = ¢p0 + 1¡¸
¸ ¢~ p
0 if 1






1 if ¢~ p < 0
2 [0;1] if ¢~ p = 0
0 if ¢~ p > 0:
Equilibria with zb = 0. In this case, Zb = 0. Recall that this requires 1
± ¸ ¡¢p.
² 1
± > ¢p0 + 1¡¸
¸ ¢~ p;¢~ p < 0.
Hence, ¹ xb = xb = xg = 1 and Xb
" = 1 ¡ ".
Suppose ¯rst that ~ µH > ^ µ. In this case,
Xg
" ¡ Xb
" = ¡(1 ¡ 2")
h
F(~ µH) ¡ F(^ µ)
i
< 0
27and therefore p0 = 1 which contradicts ¢~ p = p0 ¡ p10 < 0.
Suppose next that ~ µH · ^ µ. Then, X
g
" = Xb




"Zg ( 0 < (1 ¡ ")(1 ¡ H"(0))
Xg
"(1 ¡ Zb) > Xb
"(1 ¡ Zg) ( (1 ¡ ") > (1 ¡ ")H"(0):
Thus, p10 = 1 and p11 = 0. Then, ¢~ p < 0 requires p0 < 1. Also, ~ µH · ^ µ can only apply
if p0 · 1 ¡ 2¸ which necessitates ¸ · 1
2. Finally, it is straightforward to see that the
¯rst initial condition can be met for p0 small enough, too. By 1
± ¸ ¡¢p = 1, ± · 1.
This corresponds to case (i) in table 2.
² 1
± · ¢p0 + 1¡¸
¸ ¢~ p;¢~ p · 0.
This implies ¢p0 + 1¡¸
¸ ¢~ p ¸ 1
± ¸ ¡¢p which in turn requires ¢~ p ¸ 0. Combined
with the initial condition that ¢~ p · 0, one gets ¢~ p = p0 ¡ p10 = 0 and, hence,
¢p0 = 1
± = ¡¢p.
Accordingly, ~ µH > ^ µ and therefore
Xg
" = (1 ¡ ")
h




(1 ¡ xg)F(^ µ) + F(~ µH) ¡ F(^ µ)
i
Xb
" = (1 ¡ ")
h
xbF(^ µ) + ¹ xb
³




(1 ¡ xb)F(^ µ) + (1 ¡ ¹ xb)
³
1 ¡ F(^ µ)
´i
:
Moreover, it must be the case that
p0 > 0 ) Xg
" · Xb






p10 > 0 ) Xg
" ¸ Xb





" H"(^ µ) (5)
p11 < 1 , 0 · Xb
"
³
1 ¡ H"(^ µ)
´
: (6)
By (6), one has p11 = 0. Note that p10 = p0 but that (4) and (5) cannot both hold with
equality. Hence, p0 = p10 = 1 and ~ µH = ¡^ µ = ¦. It is straightforward to verify that






thus satisfying conditions (4) to (6).30 Since ¢p0 = ¡¢p = 1 = 1
±, this is an equilibrium
constellation for ± = 1 (case (iii) in table 2).
² 1
± T ¢p0 + 1¡¸
¸ ¢~ p;¢~ p > 0.
Note that xb = xg = 0. Then,







" = "F(~ µ0) + (1 ¡ ")
³
1 ¡ F(~ µ0)
´
Xb
" = "F(^ µ) +
³





b = 0 and ¹ x
b larger than but close to
1¡F(¦)
1¡F(¡¦).
28Observe that ¢~ p > 0 requires
p10 < 1 , (1 ¡ Zb)Xg










As " ! 0, the right hand side of (7) is arbitrarily close to zero while the left hand side
will be strictly positive. This contradicts ¢~ p > 0.
² 1
± > ¢p0 + 1¡¸
¸ ¢~ p;¢~ p = 0.
Thus, ¹ xb = 1 and xg;xb 2 [0;1]. Then
Xg
" = (1 ¡ ")
³




F(~ µ0) ¡ xgF(^ µ)
´
Xb
" = (1 ¡ ")
³








¸G(1) < ¸O(1) ( 0 < Xb
"
³
1 ¡ H"(^ µ)
´
;
implying p11 = 0.
Also, ¢~ p = 0 implies p0 = p10. The relevant belief comparisons take the form
¸G(0) T ¸ , (1 ¡ Xg
") T (1 ¡ Xb






¸G(1) T ¸O(0) , Xg
" T Xb





" H"(^ µ): (9)











a contradiction. Hence, it can only be that p10 = p0 = 1 which implies ¢p = ¡1,
¢p0 = 1 and ^ µ = ¡¦, ~ µH = ¦. It is straightforward to verify that this would be







Substitution into the bad G's incentive condition yields the quali¯cation that 1 < 1
± ,
± < 1. This corresponds to case (ii) in table 2.
Government strategies if zb > 0. Strategy zb > 0 requires 1
± · ¡¢p. If there is a policy
of quality µ1 < ^ µ, a good government plays x1 = 1 rather than 0 only if
¿(1)
h³
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)
´
p10¦ + (1 ¡ ¸)zb ¡
µ1 + p11¦
¢i
+ (1 ¡ ¿(1))p0¦
¸ ¿(0)
h³
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)
´
p10¦ + (1 ¡ ¸)zb ¡
µ1 + p11¦
¢i
+ (1 ¡ ¿(0))p0¦
,
³
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)
´
p10¦ + (1 ¡ ¸)zb ¡
µ1 + p11¦
¢








31E.g., this is the case if x
b = x
g.
29For µ1 ¸ ^ µ, there will be a proposal by the good G if
¿(1)
h³




+ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)p10¦
i
+ (1 ¡ ¿(1))p0¦
¸ ¿(0)
h³




+ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)p10¦
i
+ (1 ¡ ¿(0))p0¦
,
³












Let µ0 = maxf^ µ;µHg and µ00 = minf^ µ;µLg. Then, the good G' strategy is
xg(µ1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1 if µ1 2 [µ0; ¹ µ]
0 if µ1 2 (^ µ;µ0)
1 if µ1 2 [µ00; ^ µ]
0 if µ1 2 [µ;µ00):
Although the bad G does not value µ1 itself, it has to take its impact on the good O's reaction
into account. In particular, for µ1 < ^ µ, the bad G only proposes if
¿(1)
h³
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)
´
p10© + (1 ¡ ¸)zb ¡
Á1 + p11©
¢i
+ (1 ¡ ¿(1))p0©
¸ ¿(0)
h³
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)
´
p10© + (1 ¡ ¸)zb ¡
Á1 + p11©
¢i
+ (1 ¡ ¿(0))p0©
,
³
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)
´
p10© + (1 ¡ ¸)zb ¡
Á1 + p11©
¢
¡ p0© ¸ 0
, ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p · 1
±
For higher surpluses, µ1 ¸ ^ µ, the bad G proposes if
¿(1)
h³




+ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)p10©
i
+ (1 ¡ ¿(1))p0©
¸ ¿(0)
h³




+ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)p10©
i
+ (1 ¡ ¿(0))p0©
,
³




+ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ zb)p10© ¡ p0© ¸ 0
, ¢p0 +
(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
¸+(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p · 1
±:
The bad G's strategy therefore amounts to
xb(µ1) =
(
¹ xb if µ1 ¸ ^ µ







± > ¢p0 +
(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
¸+(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p
2 [0;1] if 1













± > ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p
2 [0;1] if 1




± < ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p:
Equilibria with zb > 0. Suppose zb = Zb = 1. This requires ¢p · ¡1
± and therefore
p10 > 0. This is possible as long as ¸G(1) ¸ ¸O(0) which requires
Xg
"(1 ¡ Zb) ¸ Xb
"(1 ¡ Zg) ) 0 ¸ Xb
"H"(^ µ); (10)
a contradiction.
Hence, zb = Zb 2 (0;1). A necessary condition is ¢p = ¡1
± < 0, and therefore, that p11 < 1
and p10 > 0. I consider the possible cases in turn.
² 1
± > ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p; 1
± > ¢p0 +
(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
¸+(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p.
Hence, ¹ xb = xb = 1 and Xb
" = 1 ¡ ". Combining the conditions above, I get
¡¢p = 1
± > ¢p0 +
(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
¸+(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p ) ¢~ p < 0:
From the conditions on ¢p, it also follows that p10 > 0 and p11 < 1 and therefore
Xg
"(1 ¡ zb) ¸ Xb










1 ¡ H"(^ µ)
´







1 ¡ H"(^ µ)
´
: (12)
Suppose ¯rst that X
g
" = Xb
" = 1 ¡ ". Then, zb(1) = zb(0). If zb < zb(¢), p11 = 0. But
this cannot be part of an equilibrium. To see this, observe that






¡ ¢p > ¢p0 ¡ ¢p
= p0 + p10 ¡ 2p11 > 0;
where the ¯rst inequality is due to ¢~ p < 0 and the second one follows from p10 > 0




" = ¡(1 ¡ 2")
³
F(µ00) + F(µH) ¡ F(^ µ)
´
< 0
and therefore p0 = 1. However, this contradicts ¢~ p < 0.
Consider now the case in which X
g
" = Xb
" = 1 ¡ " and zb = zb(¢). Note that
zb = zb(¢) = 1 ¡ H"(^ µ) = 1 ¡ F(^ µ)
31where the last equality comes from the fact that policies are always proposed. A
necessary condition for X
g













where the third inequality is due to ^ µ < 0 and the last one to assumption 3.
Finally, consider X
g
" < 1 ¡ ". In this case, one gets · zb(1) > · zb(0) and conditions (11)
and (12) are satis¯ed for zb · · zb(0), implying that the inequality in (12) will always be
strict. Consequently, p11 = 0 and the argument of the ¯rst case applies.
² ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p · 1
± < ¢p0 +
(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
¸+(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p.
Note that this requires
¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p · ¡¢p < ¢p0 +
(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
¸+(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p:
The ¯rst inequality holds for ¢~ p · 0 while the latter implies ¢~ p > 0, a contradiction.
² 1
± 6= ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p; 1
± = ¢p0 +
(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
¸+(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p.
This requires ¢~ p 6= 0. However, plugging ¡1
± = ¢p into the second equation yields the
condition ¢~ p = 0, a contradiction.
² ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p ¸ 1








these conditions imply ¢~ p > 0. However, plugging 1
± = ¡¢p into the second inequality
yields ¢~ p < 0, a contradiction.
² 1
± < ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p; 1
± < ¢p0 +
(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
¸+(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p.
Hence, ¹ xb = xb = 0 and Xb
" = ". Moreover,
¡¢p = 1
± < ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p ) 0 < ¢~ p:
Combining these conditions, one gets p0 > 0 and µL > µH > 0 > ^ µ. Therefore,
Xg










which means that p0 = 0, a contradiction to ¢~ p > 0.
32² ¢p0 +
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p = 1
± = ¢p0 +
(1¡¸)(1¡zb)
¸+(1¡¸)zb ¢~ p.
This can only be true for ¢~ p = p0 ¡ p10 = 0 and ¢p0 = 1
±. Hence,
µH = µL = 1
±¦ > ¡1
±¦ = ^ µ:
Therefore,
Xg







" = (1 ¡ ")
³






















" (1 ¡ H"(¡1
±¦)) ´ ~ zb(1) (13)
Xg
"(1 ¡ zb) ¸ Xb
"H"(¡1






±¦) ´ ~ zb(0) (14)
Xg
" ¸ Xb











" > 1. Then, p0 = 1. Moreover, as ~ zb(1) > ~ zb(0),
the inequality in (13) is strict, i.e. p11 = 1. In order to have p10 = p0, it must be
that zb · ~ zb(0). It is straightforward to establish that here is a range of (xb; ¹ xb;zb)






" = 1. Then ~ zb(0) = ~ zb(1) = 1 ¡ H"(¡1
±¦). If zb < ~ zb(¢), then
p11 = 0 and p10 = 1, so p0 must equal one. Again, there are (xb; ¹ xb;zb) for which (13)
to (15) are satis¯ed and thus constitute an equilibrium for ± = 1 (both correspond to






" = 1 and zb = ~ zb(¢) = 1 ¡ H"(¡1
±¦). This implies that
p11;p10 = p0 2 [0;1]. Indeed, there are xb, ¹ xb and px1z such that (13) to (15) and the
incentive conditions 1
± = ¡¢p = ¢p0 2 (0;1] are always satis¯ed.33 This corresponds
to case (v) in table 2 for ± ¸ 1.
B Proof of proposition 1
As for part (1), the result is immediate upon inspection of (3). With respect to part (2),
given that surplus is uniformly distributed over [µ; ¹ µ], rewriting (3) shows that WD
w ¡ WU
w
has the sign of
¡1







32For example, for x
b = ¹ x
b = 1 and z
b ! 0.
33For instance, consider x






33(i) ± · 1;¸ ¸ 1
2 xg(µ1) = 1 xb(µ1) = 1 8µ1
zg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ ¡¦
0 if µ1 < ¡¦
zb = 0
p11 = 0; p10 = 1; p0 · 1 ¡ 2¸




1 if µ1 ¸ ¦
0 if µ1 2 [¡¦;¦)
xg if µ1 < ¡¦
xb(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ 0









1 if µ1 ¸ ¡¦
0 if µ1 < ¡¦
zb = 0
p11 = 0; p10 = p0 = 1




1 if µ1 ¸ ¦
0 if µ1 2 [¡¦;¦)
¹ xg if µ1 < ¦









1 µ1 ¸ ¡¦
0 µ1 < ¡¦
zb = 0
p11 = 0; p11 = p0 = 1
(iv) ± = 1 xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ ¦
0 if µ1 < ¦





1 if µ1 ¸ ¡¦
0 if µ1 < ¡¦






p11 = 0; p10 = p0 = 1
(v) ± ¸ 1 xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ 1
±¦
0 if µ1 < 1
±¦











1 if µ1 ¸ ¡1
±¦
0 if µ1 < ¡1
±¦
zb = 1 ¡ H"(¡1
±¦)
p11 = p10 ¡ 1
± ;p10 = p0
Table 2. Equilibria with opposition veto.
34Note that 1
2(¹ µ + µ) = E[µt] and that the term in curly brackets is always positive. ¥
C Proof of lemma 5
Recall ¯rst the bad types' indi®erence conditions
p0 ¡ p11 = p10 ¡ p11 = 1
± (16)


















Using (16) and (17), voters' expected welfare can be written as
£



















+ ¸Ug + (1 ¡ ¸)Ub ¡ ¸2(1 ¡ ¸)1
±(Ug ¡ Ub)xb:
By assumption 1, the term in curly brackets is positive. H(¡1


























µ1 dF(µ1) + ¸Ug + (1 ¡ ¸)Ub:

















































±¦] < 0; (20)
34I focus on the limit case with " = 0.
35i.e. the good G's expected payo® is indeed largest for xb = 0. With regard to the good O,



























Clearly, this is maximized for xb = 0.
It remains to be shown that both the bad G and the bad O are indi®erent between the
equilibria described in lemma 4. Again using (16) and (17) and re-arranging, one gets that
their expected payo®s are p0© and (1 ¡ p0)©, respectively. This concludes the proof. ¥
D Proof of proposition 2
The sign of ¹ WD
s ¡ WU




























µ1dF(µ1) = E[µt jµt ¸ ¡¦] ¸ 0 ¥
E Proof of remark 1
For ± ! 1, the good G's proposal threshold 1
±¦ and the good O's acceptance threshold
¡1
±¦ both converge to zero. Hence, 1 ¡ F(1
±¦) # 1 ¡ F(0) and 1 ¡ F(¡1
±¦) " 1 ¡ F(0),
implying ¹ xb ! 1. Thus, projects with payo® µ1 ¸ 0 will be proposed (and consequently
approved of) with probability one. ¥
F Proof of lemma 6
I only derive the benchmarks cases listed in lemma 6. As before, the analysis deals with the
case in which the proposal decision is subject to a small probability of being reverted.
Opposition strategies. The absence of policy rivalry is only relevant when O has veto






© , 0 ¸ ¢p:
36Hence, the bad O does not condition its strategy on µ1:




1 if 0 > ¢p
2 [0;1] if 0 = ¢p
0 if 0 < ¢p:
Lemma 7. In any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, ¢p = p11 ¡ p10 = 0.
Proof. Consider the cases with (1) ¢p < 0 and (2) ¢p > 0 in turn:
1. ¢p < 0 implies zb = 1 and, hence, Zb = 1. It also requires p10 > 0. However,
Xg
"(1 ¡ Zb) < Xb
"(1 ¡ Zg) ( 0 < Xb
"H"(^ µ);
implying p10 = 0, a contradiction.
2. ¢p > 0 implies zb = 0 and, hence, Zb = 0. It also requires p11 > 0. However,
Xg
"Zb < Xb
"Zg ( 0 < Xb
"
³
1 ¡ H"(^ µ)
´
;
implying p11 = 0, a contradiction. ¥
Hence, ^ µ = ¢p¦ = 0 and the good O has an e±cient cuto®-level.
Government strategies for zb > 0. With a policy of quality µ1 < 0, a good government
proposes whenever µ1 ¸ µL ´ 1
(1¡¸)zb¢~ p¦. For µ1 ¸ 0, there will be a proposal by G if
µ1 ¸ µH ´ 1
¸+(1¡¸)zb¢~ p¦. Therefore, its strategy is
xg(µ1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1 if µ1 2 [maxf0;µHg; ¹ µ]
0 if µ1 2 (0;maxf0;µHg)
1 if µ1 2 [minf0;µLg;0]
0 if µ1 2 [µ;minf0;µLg):
As for the bad G and µ1 < 0, there is only a proposal if 1
(1¡¸)zb¢~ p · 1
±. For higher surpluses
(i.e. µ1 ¸ 0), the bad G proposes if 1
¸+(1¡¸)zb¢~ p · 1
±. The bad G' strategy is thus
xb(µ1) =
(
¹ xg if µ1 ¸ 0




























37Equilibria for zb > 0. Consider ¯rst zb = 1. In this case, Zb = 1. For µ1 < 0, a bad G
will propose if 1
± ¸ 1
1¡¸¢~ p while, for µ1 ¸ 0, it considers proposing if 1




± > ¢~ p.
Note that Xb
" = 1 ¡ ". Suppose that ¢~ p ¸ 0. Then,
Xg




+ "F(µH) < Xb
";
implying p0 = 1. In order to have p10 = p11 < 1, one must have
Xg
"(1 ¡ Zb) · Xb





" (1 ¡ H"(0))





The ¯rst condition is clearly satis¯ed. With regard to the second inequality, taking
limits on both sides yields
0 < F(µH) ¡ 1¡¸
1¡¸F(µH)F(0);
so the latter condition applies as well and p10 = p11 = 0. Hence, ¢~ p = 1, µH = ¦ and
1
± must be larger than 1
1¡¸. This corresponds to case (i') in table 3.
² 1
± = 1
(1¡¸)¢~ p > ¢~ p.
This implies
Xg






" = (1 ¡ ")
³
xbF(0) + 1 ¡ F(0)
´
+ "(1 ¡ xb)F(0);
which means that X
g
" < Xb
" and therefore p0 = 1. In order to have p10 = p11 < 1,
Xg
"(1 ¡ Zb) · Xb





" (1 ¡ H"(0))
, (1 ¡ 2")
³








Again, the ¯rst condition always applies with a strict inequality. Hence p11 = 0. With
regard to the latter inequality, taking limits as " ! 0 yields







which is true for all xb 2 [0;1]. Hence, ¢~ p = 1, and this is an equilibrium for ± = 1¡¸




± > ¢~ p.
The strategies and beliefs are equivalent to the previous case with xb = 0. By the initial
conditions, this is therefore an equilibrium for ± 2 (1 ¡ ¸;1) (case (iii') in table 3).






Note that ¢~ p > 0 implies
Xg






" = (1 ¡ ")¹ xb (1 ¡ F(0)) + "
³












1¡F(0) ¡ ¹ xb
o
:
The conditions that ¢~ p > 0 and ¢p = 0 can only be true if
Xg
"Zb · Xb
"Zg ) zb · zb(1)
Xg
"(1 ¡ Zb) · Xb






Suppose ¹ xb =
1¡F(µH)
1¡F(0) so that Xb
" = X
g
" and zb(0) = zb(1) = 1 ¡ H"(0). Then,
zb = 1 ¡ H"(0) and p0 and p10 = p11 can be chosen from [0;1] in order to meet the
initial conditions. In particular, as " ! 0,







± ¸ ¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ H"(0)) ! 1:
This corresponds to case (iv') in table 3. ¥
39(i') xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ ¦
0 if µ1 < ¦
xb(µ1) = 1 8µ1
± < 1 ¡ ¸ zg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ 0
0 if µ1 < 0
zb = 1
p11 = p10 = 0; p0 = 1
(ii') xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ ¦
0 if µ1 < ¦
xb(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ 0
xb if µ1 < 0
± = 1 ¡ ¸ zg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ 0
0 if µ1 < 0
zb = 1
p11 = p10 = 0; p0 = 1
(iii') xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ ¦
0 if µ1 < ¦
xb(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ 0
0 if µ1 < 0
± 2 (1 ¡ ¸;1) zg(µ1) =
(
1 µ1 ¸ 0
0 µ1 < 0
zb = 1
p11 = p10 = 0; p0 = 1
(iv') xg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ µH




1¡F(0) if µ1 ¸ 0
0 if µ1 < 0
± ¸ zg(µ1) =
(
1 if µ1 ¸ 0
0 if µ1 < 0
zb = 1 ¡ H"(0)
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ H"(0)) p11 = p10 ;
p0 ¡ p10 =
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡H"(0))
±
H" ! 0; µH " 1
±¦; p0 ¡ p10 " 1
±
Table 3. Equilibria with opposition veto { No policy rivalry.
40